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CONTINENTAL DRIFT: 
CONTEXTUALIZING CITIZENS UNITED BY 
COMPARING THE DIVERGENT BRITISH 
AND AMERICAN APPROACHES TO 
POLITICAL ADVERTISING 
Alexander Boer* 
Abstract: There is perhaps no more vital an issue to a healthy democracy 
than its attitude towards political speech. Because political speech—and 
particularly political advertising—has a profound influence on the out-
comes of elections, most vibrant democracies recognize the need to avoid 
arbitrary distinctions among political advertisers that might sway elections 
for reasons other than the popularity of the candidates. The First 
Amendment avoids arbitrary distinctions by ensuring a free and open 
marketplace of ideas in the political speech realm, with almost no restric-
tions on political advertising. The United Kingdom, by contrast, addresses 
the problem by way of an outright ban on political advertising. This Note 
explores the recent, and controversial, Citizens United decision in the con-
text of avoiding such groundless distinctions. In particular, this Note 
compares the American approach to the British approach, and argues 
that Citizens United is a correct reaction, within American constitutional 
law and case law, to the problem of arbitrary distinctions in the political 
advertising realm. 
Introduction 
 In a democratic society, there is perhaps no more fundamental an 
issue than choosing how to protect political speech—and why.1 The 
Founders of the United States enshrined the right to free speech at the 
very top of the Bill of Rights.2 Indeed, the protection of speech en-
sconced in the First Amendment was one of the reasons for the separa-
                                                                                                                      
* Alexander Boer is a Note Editor for the Boston College International & Comparative 
Law Review. 
1 Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1976) (discussing the “profound” commit-
ment of the United States to freedom of political speech). 
2 See U.S. Const. amend. I. 
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tion of the Colonies from the United Kingdom.3 So it is not surprising 
that, over the last 200 years, American and British conceptions of pro-
tected speech have evolved along very different lines.4 
 With the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in Citizens United v. 
Federal Election Commission, the ocean that separates the United States’ 
and the United Kingdom’s respective laws has grown wider still.5 In 
fact, the United States and the United Kingdom are moving in separate 
directions.6 Whereas in Citizens United, the Supreme Court removed a 
longstanding ban on corporate expenditures on political advertising, 
the House of Lords, together with Parliament, has recently circled the 
wagons against European Union challenges to the United Kingdom’s 
robust restrictions on political advertising—both by individuals and 
corporations.7 
 Yet these policies—which differ with respect to political advertising 
in particular, and independent expenditures in general—are actually 
reactions to the same basic problems: How can society draw the line in 
determining which speech to protect, and by whom?8 And who is to 
make such decisions?9 The Citizens United Court rejected the distinction 
between corporations and individuals in the political advertising con-
text, thus widening the scope of protected speech, whereas the categori-
cal ban in the United Kingdom has always applied equally to both.10 
 Part I of this Note sets forth the laws of the United States and the 
United Kingdom as they relate to corporate political advertising. Part II 
discusses the policies and assumptions that undergird and explain cur-
rent law in the United States and the United Kingdom. Finally, Part III 
                                                                                                                      
3 See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64–65 (1960) (discussing British impingements 
on colonial free speech and their deleterious effects on colonial citizens). 
4 Compare Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 917 (2010) (strik-
ing down a ban on corporate political advertising), with Keith D. Ewing, Promoting Political 
Equality: Spending Limits in British Electoral Law, 2 Election L.J. 499, 522 (2003) (“The 
spending limits in British electoral law are more wide ranging and comprehensive than in 
almost any comparable democracy.”). 
5 Compare Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 917 (striking down a ban on corporate political 
advertising), with R (on the application of Animal Defenders Int’l) v. Sec’y of State for 
Culture, Media & Sport, [2008] 1 A.C. 1312 (H.L.)1349 (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.) 
(upholding a categorical ban on all political advertising, no matter the source). 
6 Compare Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 917, with Animal Defenders, [2008] 1 A.C. at 1349. 
7 Compare Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 917, with Animal Defenders, [2008] 1 A.C. at 1349. 
8 Cf. Martin H. Redish & Howard M. Wasserman, What’s Good for General Motors: Corpo-
rate Speech and the Theory of Free Expression, 66 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 235, 260 (1998) (discuss-
ing the process of creating distinctions among speakers in the political speech domain). 
9 See id. 
10 Compare Communications Act, 2003, c. 21, § 321(2) (Eng.), with Citizens United, 130 
S. Ct. at 917. 
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argues that Citizens United is consistent with First Amendment jurispru-
dence in the United States, and that any attempt to reverse the result of 
Citizens United would require a fundamental reordering of the Ameri-
can electoral process and free speech jurisprudence. 
I. Background 
 Restrictions on corporate political advertising have followed very 
different paths in the United States and the United Kingdom.11 In Brit-
ain, heavy restrictions on political advertising—both corporate and 
otherwise—have been in place in some form for over 100 years.12 In 
the United States, restrictions on independent political expenditures 
are a more recent phenomenon.13 
 As discussed infra, the United States has pulled back from its re-
strictions on political advertising by removing the legal distinction be-
tween corporations and individuals in the political advertising sphere; 
in contrast, the British government has bristled at the European Court 
of Human Rights’ (ECHR) insistence that the British scheme banning 
all political advertising runs afoul of Article 10 of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights (the Convention) by imposing an unneces-
sary restriction on political speech.14 
A. The History and Development of U.S. Law on  
Corporate Political Advertising 
1. Statutory History 
 Although political tension has accompanied the corporate form 
ever since corporations were created by individual acts of state legisla-
tures, the issue of corporate involvement in politics reached fever pitch 
in the 1904 presidential contest between Theodore Roosevelt and Al-
                                                                                                                      
11 Compare Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 917 (2010), with R 
(on the application of Animal Defenders Int’l) v. Sec’y of State for Culture, Media & Sport, 
[2008] 1 A.C. 1312 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.)(U.K.). Because spending on political 
advertising is a subset of the broader class of “independent expenditures,” for the pur-
poses of this Note, a restriction on independent expenditures will be considered to be a de 
facto restriction on political advertising as well. 
12 See Ewing, supra note 4, at 501. 
13 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 953 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the ban on 
corporate independent expenditures was passed in 1947); Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. 
Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449, 511 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
14 Compare Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 917, with Animal Defenders, [2008] 1 A.C. at 1349. 
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ton B. Parker.15 Parker noisily drew attention to Roosevelt’s acceptance 
of large amounts of corporate donations.16 Although Roosevelt pre-
vailed, he was shamed into calling for a ban on corporate contributions 
the following year.17 Congress responded by passing the Tillman Act in 
1907, which placed special limitations on corporations’ campaign 
spending, including a ban on corporate contributions to federal candi-
dates.18 
 The Senate Report that accompanied passage of the Tillman Act 
was hardly loquacious in justifying the codification in law of a distinc-
tion between individuals and corporations: 
[T]he evils of the use of [corporate] money in connection 
with political elections are so generally recognized that the 
committee deems it unnecessary to make any argument in fa-
vor of the general purpose of this measure. It is in the interest 
of good government and calculated to promote purity in the 
selection of public officials.19 
This justification was evidently sufficient to convince thirty-six states to 
pass similar laws by 1928.20 
 In 1947, Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Act, thereby extending 
the prohibition on corporate spending to cover not only direct contri-
butions, but also the use of general treasury funds for independent ex-
penditures, defined as non-contribution spending to influence an elec-
tion.21 A similar provision restricting individuals from making political 
expenditures of $1,000 or more was struck down by the Supreme 
Court, thus creating a de facto distinction in law between independent 
expenditures made by corporations and those made by individuals.22 
 As of the hearing of Citizens United, 2 U.S.C. § 441b contained the 
restriction on a corporation’s use of general treasury funds to make in-
dependent expenditures that expressly advocate for the election or de-
                                                                                                                      
15 See Adam Winkler, The Corporation in Election Law, 32 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1243, 1247 
(1999). 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Tillman Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59–36, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (codified as amended 
at 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2000)); Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 952; Winkler, supra note 15, at 1247. 
19 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 952–53 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting S. Rep. No. 59–
3056, at 2 (1906)) (second brackets in original). 
20 Winkler, supra note 15, at 1247. 
21 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 953 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 
511 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
22 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39, 45 (1976). 
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feat of a particular candidate, or that function as “electioneering com-
munications.”23 The statute defines “electioneering communications” as 
communications that: (1) refer to a “clearly identified candidate for 
Federal office”; (2) are made within thirty days of a primary or sixty days 
of a general election; and (3) are targeted to the “relevant electorate.”24 
2. Case Law 
 Perhaps the best starting point for a discussion on corporate po-
litical advertising is the foundational case that established the proposi-
tion that corporations should be treated as people under the law.25 In 
Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co., the Supreme Court 
held that corporations are persons within the meaning of the Four-
teenth Amendment.26 Thus, since Santa Clara the onus has been on 
those arguing that corporations should be distinguished from individu-
als to prove that they are in fact different under the law.27 
 The ban on independent political expenditures was challenged in 
the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo.28 In Buckley, the Court found that 
a ban on independent political expenditures of over $1,000 was an un-
constitutional restriction on free speech under the First Amendment— 
at least insofar as it applied to individuals.29 The Court did not pass ex-
plicitly on the question of the constitutionality of sustaining the ban 
with respect to corporations; the Court did, however, point out that the 
First Amendment protects political association as well as political ex-
pression.30 
 Two years later, in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, the Su-
preme Court considered a Massachusetts law prohibiting corporations 
from making contributions or expenditures intended to influence or 
affect the vote on any issue submitted to voters, other than one affect-
ing any of the property, business, or assets of the corporation in a mate-
rial fashion.31 The Court held that the law was unconstitutional under 
the First Amendment, because it restricted expression that the First 
                                                                                                                      
23 Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2000); Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 
887. 
24 Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3) (2000). 
25 See First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 780 (1978); Santa Clara Cnty. 
v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886). 
26 See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 780; Santa Clara, 118 U.S. at 396. 
27 See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 780. 
28 See generally Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39, 45. 
29 See id. 
30 See id. at 15. 
31 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 767–78. 
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Amendment is designed to protect.32 Significantly, the Court wrote that 
the “inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing 
the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether 
corporation, association, union, or individual.”33 Still, the Bellotti case 
dealt with the issue of restrictions on corporate expenditures during a 
referendum, not an election.34 This fact, together with the Court’s care-
ful limitation of its holding, left unresolved the question of whether a 
distinction could be made between corporations and individuals in an 
electoral setting.35 
 That question was taken up twelve years later in Austin v. Michigan 
Chamber of Commerce.36 In Austin, the Court evaluated a Michigan statute 
that prohibited corporations from using corporate treasury funds for 
independent expenditures in support of, or in opposition to, any can-
didate in elections for state office.37 The Court found that the statute 
was constitutional, because it was narrowly tailored to serve the compel-
ling state interest of preventing corruption and distortion of the politi-
cal process.38 In so holding, the Court blessed the legal distinction be-
tween corporations and individuals in the political expenditure (and by 
extension political advertising) sphere.39 
 Austin was at the front of the Court’s mind when Citizens United 
reached the Court’s docket at the end of 2009.40 At issue was § 441b, 
discussed above, and whether its prohibition of corporate political ad-
vertising expenditures violates the First Amendment.41 
 In January of 2008, Citizens United, a nonprofit corporation, re-
leased a film entitled Hillary: The Movie (Hillary).42 Hillary was a ninety-
minute documentary meant to expose the shortcomings of Senator Hil-
lary Clinton, a candidate for President.43 Citizens United wanted to dis-
tribute Hillary via video on demand, a technology that allows cable sub-
                                                                                                                      
32 Id. at 776. 
33 Id. at 777. 
34 See id. at 767–78. 
35 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 958 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 787–88. 
36 Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 654 (1990), overruled by 130 S. 
Ct. 876 (2010). 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 655. 
39 See id. (implying that corporations and individuals could be treated differently un-
der political speech law because corporate independent expenditures could be sup-
pressed, whereas individuals’ independent expenditures were allowed). 
40 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 886. 
41 See id. 
42 Id. at 887. 
43 Id. 
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scribers to download video programs to their home televisions.44 In or-
der to avoid the civil and criminal sanctions of § 441b, Citizens United 
sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the Federal Election 
Commission (FEC).45 
 After a lengthy discussion regarding the tenability of a distinction 
between corporations and individuals in the political speech domain, 
the Court struck down § 441b as an unconstitutional restriction on pro-
tected speech.46 Consequently, any law restricting corporate—but not 
individual—spending for political advertising was rendered unconstitu-
tional.47 
B. The History and Development of British Law on Independent  
Political Expenditures 
1. Statutory History 
 The United Kingdom has placed some manner of restrictions on 
independent political expenditures since 1883.48 In 1983, Parliament 
passed the Representation of the People Act, which contains a provi-
sion providing that only candidates and their agents may incur ex-
penses of the kind set forth in the Act “with a view to promoting or 
procuring the election of a candidate.”49 Expenses set forth in the Act 
include those associated with public meetings, ads, publications, or 
otherwise presenting views to the electorate—but with an exception for 
newspaper editorials.50 The Act carved out one additional exception: 
individuals could make independent political expenditures of fifty 
pence.51 This amount was subsequently raised to five pounds, and has 
recently been elevated to 500 pounds.52 
                                                                                                                      
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 888. 
46 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 917. The Justices’ various opinions in Citizens United 
stretched to over 100 pages and included prolix and nuanced arguments, counter-argu-
ments, and historical analysis. See generally id. at 876–982. Some of the most salient arguments 
for a ban on political advertising will be detailed below; it is unnecessary for the purposes of 
this Note to go into any more detail here. 
47 See id. 
48 Ewing, supra note 4, at 501. 
49 Representation of the People Act, 1983, c. 2, § 75 (Eng.); Ewing, supra note 4, at 503. 
50 Representation of the People Act, 1983, c. 2, § 75 (Eng.); Ewing, supra note 4, at 503. 
51 Representation of the People Act, 1983, c. 2, § 75 (Eng.); Ewing, supra note 4, at 503. 
52 Representation of the People Act, 1983, c. 2, § 75 (Eng.) (displaying the new 500 
pound limit); Colin Feasby, Issue Advocacy and Third Parties in the United Kingdom and Can-
ada, 48 McGill L.J. 11, 28 (2003). 
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 Nevertheless, because of the Communications Act 2003, none of 
these 500 pounds may be spent on television or radio advertisements.53 
The Act provides that no licensed broadcast stations may air an adver-
tisement produced by a group “whose objects are wholly or mainly of a 
political nature,” or any advertisement that is “directed towards any po-
litical end.”54 The Act sets forth a broad definition of “political ends,” 
including statements that would influence an election, changes in law 
or policy, or public opinion—whether in the United Kingdom or else-
where.55 Thus the prohibition discriminates based on both the content 
of speech and the identity of the proponent speaker.56 
2. Case Law 
 Unlike in the United States, recent challenges to the United King-
dom’s regulatory structure governing political advertising have come 
from outside the country.57 The first such challenge was Bowman v. United 
Kingdom, a case calling into question the United Kingdom’s scheme on 
independent expenditures.58 Mrs. Bowman, a British woman heading a 
pro-life group, spent in excess of five pounds (the statutory maximum at 
the time) in order to distribute a leaflet that detailed various parliamen-
tary representatives’ voting histories on abortion issues.59 Mrs. Bowman 
was prosecuted under the United Kingdom’s criminal statutes, but she 
escaped conviction based on a procedural technicality.60 Nevertheless, 
she took her challenge of the United Kingdom’s ban to the ECHR.61 
                                                                                                                      
53 See Communications Act, 2003, c. 21, § 321(2) (Eng.) (stating that advertisements 
that are political in nature contravene the prohibition set up by the Act). 
54 Id. 
55 See id.; Animal Defenders, [2008] 1 A.C. at 1337–38. 
56 See Communications Act, 2003, c. 21, § 321(2) (Eng.); Animal Defenders, [2008] 1 A.C. 
at 1337–38. 
57 See, e.g., Bowman v. United Kingdom, App. No. 24839/94, 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 1–2 
(1998); see also Ewing, supra note 4, at 522 (discussing the impact on British law of VgT 
Verein gegen Tierfabriken v. Switzerland, App. No. 24699/94, 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. 4 (2002)). 
58 See Bowman, 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1–2. 
59 Id. Unimaginably for Americans, the British political parties consider abortion to be 
an issue of personal moral import, and do not keep track of their members’ voting records 
on the issue. Cf. id. at 4–5 (stating that Mrs. Bowman had to inform voters of their repre-
sentatives’ voting histories on abortion); Samuel Issacharoff, The Constitutional Logic of 
Campaign Finance Regulation, 36 Pepp. L. Rev. 373, 379 (2009). British citizens are similarly 
in the dark as to their representatives’ votes with respect to abortion. Cf. Bowman, 26 Eur. 
H.R. Rep. at 4–5; Issacharoff, supra, at 379. 
60 Feasby, supra note 52, at 25. 
61 Id. 
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 Mrs. Bowman challenged the British political expenditures law on 
the grounds that it violated Article 10 of the Convention.62 Article 10 
guarantees protection of free speech in Member States of the Euro-
pean Union.63 The ECHR noted that a restriction on free speech could 
be upheld in the face of Article 10 if it is both proportionate to a le-
gitimate governmental aim and “necessary in a democratic society.”64 
Ultimately, however, the ECHR found the British government’s argu-
ments in favor of the law unconvincing, and held that the ban violated 
Article 10 of the Convention.65 
 Several years later, another ECHR ruling cast doubt on the British 
regulatory system’s compatibility with Article 10.66 Although the spe-
cific statute in question in VgT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v. Switzerland 
(VgT ) was Swiss, it was nearly identical in content to the Communica-
tions Act 2003 in that it banned political advertising by third parties, 
and was motivated by largely the same policy concerns.67 In VgT, the 
ECHR held that the Swiss ban on political advertising by third parties 
violated Article 10; in so holding, the court rejected many of the argu-
ments put forth by Switzerland (and the United Kingdom) that the ban 
was “necessary in a democratic society.”68 
 In 2008, the House of Lords responded to these extra-national 
challenges to British law.69 Although British courts are not bound by 
ECHR decisions, by law they must take these decisions into account— 
and British courts often follow them.70 Nevertheless, in R (on the applica-
tion of Animal Defenders International) v. Secretary of State for Culture, Media 
& Sport, the House of Lords upheld the Communications Act 2003 in 
the face of a challenge to its compatibility with Article 10, stating that 
the ban on political advertising on television and radio is indeed “nec-
essary in a democratic society,” and is therefore a legitimate restriction 
on free speech under Article 10.71 
                                                                                                                      
62 Bowman, 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 9. 
63 Id. 
64 See id. at 10, 12. 
65 See id. at 13. 
66 See VgT, 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 178; Ewing, supra note 4, at 522 (calling VgT a potential 
“mortal blow” to the advertising ban in Britain). 
67 Ewing, supra note 4, at 521. 
68 See VgT, 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 178. 
69 See Animal Defenders, [2008] 1 A.C. at 1349. 
70 Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, §§ 3, 2(a) (U.K.) (stating that “[s]o far as it is possible 
to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation [in the United Kingdom] must be 
read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights” as spelled out 
by the ECHR); Ewing, supra note 4, at 521. 
71 [2008] 1 A.C. at 1349. 
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II. Discussion 
 Ultimately, the United States’ and the United Kingdom’s divergent 
approaches to political advertising can be explained by policymakers’ 
different justifications for their respective rules.72 In the United States, 
legislators and courts have focused largely on protection of the market-
place of ideas—a concept that emphasizes the quantity of allowed 
speech over its quality.73 The United Kingdom, by contrast, has pursued 
equality of voice for individuals, corporations, and candidates.74 In do-
ing so, British policymakers have favored the supposed quality of speech 
in an election cycle, consciously at the expense of its quantity.75 
A. Motivations for the Overturned American Ban on Corporate  
Political Advertising 
1. Anticorruption 
 One of the most commonly deployed arguments in favor of restric-
tions on corporate political expenditures and, more specifically, politi-
cal advertising, is the concern over the potentially corruptive influence 
of corporate spending.76 Critics of corporate political spending typi-
cally address both classic quid pro quo corruption and more subtle, less 
direct forms of corruption, whereas advocates of corporate advertising 
focus only on quid pro quo arrangements.77 
 With respect to quid pro quo corruption, the argument is that 
corporations would use their ability to spend vast sums on political ad-
vertising as a lever in securing political favors from the politicians they 
support.78 “Subtler,” non-quid pro quo corruption is more difficult to 
define.79 In his dissent in Citizens United, Justice John Paul Stevens ar-
gues that political expenditures (whether made by individuals or cor-
porations), including political advertising, are essentially fungible with 
                                                                                                                      
72 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. at 901–02 (2010); R (on the 
application of Animal Defenders Int’l) v. Sec’y of State for Culture, Media & Sport, [2008] 
1 A.C. 1312 (H.L.) 1346 (appeal taken from Eng.)(U.K.); Redish & Wasserman, supra note 
8, at 256. 
73 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 907, 912; Redish & Wasserman, supra note 8, at 256. 
74 See Animal Defenders, [2008] 1 A.C. at 1346. 
75 See id. 
76 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 901–02; Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 
652, 660 (1990), overruled by 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
77 Compare Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 907, 912, with Austin, 494 U.S. at 660. 
78 Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 341, 388 (2009). 
79 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 961 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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direct campaign contributions—and may even exert “far more influ-
ence” than direct contributions.80 The dispute between the majority 
and Justice Stevens regarding the meaning of “corruption” in Supreme 
Court jurisprudence—that is, whether it refers to quid pro quo corrup-
tion only, or whether it is a more general term—remains unresolved.81 
 The Court has bundled the interest to prevent the appearance of 
corruption into the anticorruption argument, in an effort to preserve 
not only the functioning of the political system, but also the electorate’s 
faith in that system.82 As Justice Stevens writes in his Citizens United dis-
sent, a “democracy cannot function effectively when its constituent 
members believe laws are being bought and sold.”83 
 Whatever the term’s specific meaning, the Court made it clear in 
Austin that, if corporate political advertising is to be limited at all, the 
anticorruption interest would be the most convincing rationale for such 
a limitation.84 According to the Bellotti Court, “[p]reserving the integ-
rity of the electoral process [and] preventing corruption . . . are inter-
ests of the highest importance.”85 Still, the Court’s decision in Citizens 
United (together with Buckley) reversed course from Austin, and rejected 
the argument that the anticorruption interest is sufficient to justify a 
ban on corporate political advertising.86 
2. Antidistortion 
 Although elements of the antidistortion interest have cropped up 
in the political speech debate for decades, this interest found its clear-
est expression in Austin and Citizens United.87 Whereas the anticorrup-
tion interest focuses on the inner machinations of the political process, 
proponents of the antidistortion interest seek to protect public debate 
from disruptive influence.88 According to Justice Stevens’ dissent in 
                                                                                                                      
80 See id. at 965 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
81 See id. at 901–02, 965 (showing the dispute between the majority, who only men-
tioned quid pro quo, and Justice Stevens, who in his dissent also explored subtler forms of 
corruption); Teachout, supra note 78, at 385. The academic literature is more helpful than 
the Supreme Court case law in distinguishing between quid pro quo and other forms of 
corruption. See, e.g., id. at 373–83. 
82 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976). 
83 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 964 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
84 See Austin, 494 U.S. at 660; First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788–
89 (1978). 
85 See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788–89. 
86 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 886 (holding that the anticorruption interest is not 
sufficient to uphold a ban on corporate political advertising); Austin, 494 U.S. at 660. 
87 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 974 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Austin, 494 U.S. at 660. 
88 See Austin, 494 U.S. at 660. 
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Citizens United, corporations are capable of “unfair influence” in the 
electoral process which can “distort public debate in ways that under-
mine rather than advance the interests of listeners.”89 This distortive 
effect is attributable to two characteristics of corporations: first, their 
unique ability to easily raise large amounts of capital with which to pur-
chase advertisements and other communications; and second, the fact 
that, owing to directors’ fiduciary duties, corporations must participate 
in the political process only to enhance shareholder value, “no matter 
how persuasive the arguments for a broader or conflicting set of priori-
ties.”90 
 This rhetoric masks a somewhat vague set of motivations for the 
antidistortion interest.91 As will be discussed below, the antidistortion 
interest shares with the British political equality interest at least a sur-
face concern with the ability of “ordinary people” to have their voices 
heard in the political process.92 Nevertheless, at other times, American 
advocates of the antidistortion interest have expressly disavowed the 
argument that limits should be placed on corporate political speech in 
the pursuit of speech equalization.93 
 Perhaps the most accurate articulation of the antidistortion interest 
is twofold.94 First, commentators are concerned about corporations’ 
ostensibly unique ability to spend prodigious amounts of money to pub-
licize their positions.95 Second, there is the avowed danger that corpora-
tions will use their deep coffers to fund advertisements that bear “little 
or no correlation to the ideas of natural persons.”96 
3. Shareholder Protection 
 The third argument for distinguishing between private individuals 
and corporations in the political advertising context focuses on the in-
                                                                                                                      
89 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 974 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
90 See id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
91 Cf. id. at 958 (discussing several possible motivations for the antidistortion interest). 
92 Cf. id. (arguing that the Constitution permits restrictions on speech by some in or-
der to “prevent the few from drowning out the many”); Animal Defenders, [2008] 1 A.C. at 
1345–46. 
93 See, e.g., Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 558. 
94 See id. at 974 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Austin, 494 U.S. at 660; Robert H. Sitkoff, Cor-
porate Political Speech, Political Extortion, and the Competition for Corporate Charters, 69 U. Chi. 
L. Rev. 1103, 1111 (2002). 
95 See Austin, 494 U.S. at 660; Sitkoff, supra note 94, at 1111. Critics have noted that this 
argument applies equally to wealthy individuals whose independent political expenditures 
remain unrestricted. Austin, 494 U.S. at 680 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
96 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 974 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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ternal structure and function of the corporation, rather than on the in-
tegrity of the political marketplace of ideas.97 The shareholder protec-
tion rationale begins with the premise that shareholders’ First Amend-
ment rights are compromised when a corporation uses its treasury funds 
to publicize a view to which its shareholders are opposed.98 
 Opponents respond that, if shareholders are opposed to the po-
litical messages that the corporation has broadcast, they are free to ei-
ther pursue their cause using the normal mechanisms of corporate 
governance, or sell their shares and invest in a company whose politics 
are more in line with their own.99 Proponents of shareholder protec-
tion argue that requiring shareholders to sell their shares if they dis-
agree with the political speech of the corporation would “impose a fi-
nancial sacrifice on those objecting to political expenditures.”100 
 There is intense debate surrounding the latter contention.101 In 
the process of rejecting the shareholder protection rationale, the Bellotti 
Court noted that “shareholders normally are presumed competent to 
protect their own interests.”102 Scholars have also pointed out that 
shareholders invest in stock for the purposes of securing income, and 
therefore only a threat to their rate of return could constitute an eco-
nomic disincentive.103 By hypothesis, such an economic investor would 
be indifferent between two companies with similar rates of return.104 
Therefore, unless there is simply no other company offering a compa-
rable return—an unlikely prospect in a well-developed, efficient mar-
ket—the shareholder faces no economic disincentive from merely shift-
ing his investment to another company.105 Furthermore, according to 
the efficient capital markets hypothesis, which postulates that stock 
prices reflect all publicly available information, proper disclosure of 
corporate spending on political advertising would ensure that “the size 
of a corporation’s treasury available for political activity lines up with its 
investors’ support for that activity.”106 
                                                                                                                      
97 See Austin, 494 U.S. at 673. 
98 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 977 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
99 See Austin, 494 U.S. at 687 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
100 Id. at 674 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
101 See, e.g., Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 795 (Burger, J., concurring); Sitkoff, supra note 94, at 
1120 (calling the financial sacrifice argument “nonsense”). 
102 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 795. 
103 See Sitkoff, supra note 94, at 1120. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 See id. at 1110. More specifically, commentators claim that investors will react unfa-
vorably to excessive political donations, and managers will respond by reducing such ex-
penditures to remove the drag on their company’s stock price. See id. 
104 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 34:91 
 In sum, the shareholder protection argument suggests that corpo-
rations can receive differential treatment in election law because their 
internal structure creates First Amendment concerns that are not im-
plicated by individual speech.107 
4. Corporations as Creatures of State Law 
 Proponents of regulation have countered resistance to limitations 
on corporate political speech by pointing out that corporations are 
creatures of state law, and are therefore susceptible to regulation by the 
State.108 State law grants corporations “special advantages” like “limited 
liability, perpetual life, and favorable treatment” that facilitate the rais-
ing of capital.109 In turn, these special advantages, which are intended 
to encourage success in the economic marketplace, may be utilized to 
dominate the political marketplace.110 Proponents argue that corpo-
rate political speech must be regulated to prevent this potentially harm-
ful spillover into the political sphere.111 In his dissent in Citizens United, 
Justice Stevens wrote, “[l]egislatures are entitled to decide that the 
state-granted privileges of the corporation require particular scrutiny 
and higher level of regulation of their activities.”112 
                                                                                                                     
 Notably, this argument is generally advanced as a non-arbitrary rea-
son why the law may distinguish between corporations and private indi-
viduals, rather than as an independent justification for the regulation of 
corporate political advertising.113 The impetus for actually making this 
distinction is generally supplied by one of the arguments discussed 
above, rendering the state law argument derivative of the others.114 
 
107 See Austin, 494 U.S. at 673 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
108 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 947 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
109 Austin, 494 U.S. at 658–59. 
110 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 809 (White, J., dissenting). 
111 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 947 (Stephens, J., dissenting); Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 809 
(White, J., dissenting). 
112 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 947 (Stephens, J., dissenting). 
113 See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 809 (White, J., dissenting). 
114 See, e.g., Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 974 (Stephens, J., dissenting); Austin, 494 U.S. 
at 673 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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B. Motivations for the United Kingdom’s Categorical Ban  
on Political Advertising 
1. Anticorruption 
 As previously discussed, the United Kingdom does not distinguish 
between private individuals and corporations; its ban on political adver-
tising is categorical.115 The British anticorruption interest is virtually 
identical to its American counterpart, and British courts take no great 
care to distinguish it from the other arguments in support of a ban on 
political advertising.116 
2. Antidistortion 
 The British antidistortion interest is, on the surface, similar to its 
American counterpart, but courts in the United Kingdom have articu-
lated the interest with more force.117 British courts and commentators 
have vociferously advanced the antidistortion rationale as one of the twin 
pillars of justification for a categorical ban on political advertising.118 
 The British antidistortion interest is grounded in a protective atti-
tude towards British citizens.119 As the Animal Defenders court com-
mented, there is a risk that “objects which are essentially political may 
come to be accepted by the public not because they are . . . right but 
because, by dint of constant repetition, the public has been conditioned 
to accept them.”120 In VgT, the ECHR noted that a Swiss statute with si-
milarities to the British ban was motivated by a desire to protect the pub-
lic from the pressures of powerful financial groups that might distort 
the political debate.121 These formulations of the argument each hint at 
the fundamental risk that some participants in the political process, par-
ticularly wealthy individuals and groups, would, if allowed to participate, 
contribute speech that would lead voters astray.122 In the United States, 
such reasoning is anathema to constitutional commentators who argue 
                                                                                                                      
115 See Communications Act, 2003, c. 21, § 321(2) (Eng.). 
116 See Feasby, supra note 52, at 16. 
117 See Animal Defenders, [2008] 1 A.C. at 1346. 
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119 See id. 
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121 VgT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v. Switzerland, App. No. 24699/94, 34 Eur. H.R. 
Rep. 4, 174 (2002). 
122 See Animal Defenders, [2008] 1 A.C. at 1346. 
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that government cannot suppress speech “on the grounds that it is too 
persuasive.”123 
3. Political Equality 
 The most important argument advanced by the United Kingdom to 
justify its ban on political advertising is almost completely absent from 
the mainstream debate in the United States.124 In the United Kingdom, 
the powerful blanket ban is justified by the concern that rich citizens 
and organizations might be able to be heard over the average citizen, 
based solely on ability to pay.125 In the context of the electoral process, 
“political equality” is typically defined as the equality of individuals’ abil-
ity to affect political debate.126 The role of British electoral law, there-
fore, is to avoid giving any advantage to wealthy participants.127 
 The Animal Defenders court explained the theory underlying British 
elections as follows: 
 The fundamental rationale of the democratic process is 
that if competing views, opinions and policies are publicly de-
bated and exposed to public scrutiny the good will over time 
drive out the bad and the true prevail over the false. It must 
be assumed that, given time, the public will make a sound 
choice . . . . But it is highly desirable that the playing field of 
debate should be so far as practicable level.128 
 One might question precisely why the State should deny any advan-
tage to the wealthy. The Animal Defenders court stresses that, to function 
properly, a democracy must be “truly democratic.”129 If participants in 
the electoral process can purchase opportunities to advertise in propor-
tion to their ability to pay, elections “become little more than an auc-
                                                                                                                      
123 Redish & Wasserman, supra note 8, at 267 (emphasis added). 
124 Compare Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 958 (Stephens, J., dissenting), with Animal De-
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tion.”130 Commentators have suggested that the concept of political 
equality should not be stretched to limit speakers’ influence based on 
their ability to persuade; instead, it ought to be targeted specifically at 
advantages produced by simple possession of wealth.131 
III. Analysis 
A. The High Value of Political Speech 
 Despite the distance between the United States’ and the United 
Kingdom’s respective approaches to the regulation of political advertis-
ing, the two nations start with a common premise: political speech is 
the most sacred form of communication in a democracy, and therefore 
deserves the State’s highest protection.132 In Austin, the Court wrote 
that independent campaign spending constitutes “political expression 
at the core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment free-
doms.”133 There are two key reasons for the exalted position of political 
speech.134 First, political discourse between and among candidates and 
citizens is the mechanism by which the government is held accountable 
to the people.135 Second, a robust political dialogue enhances the abil-
ity of the public to make an informed decision among the various can-
didates for office.136 
 Similarly, the United Kingdom places great emphasis on freedom 
of political speech.137 According to the Animal Defenders court, such 
freedom is an “essential condition of an intellectually healthy soci-
ety.”138 The court also emphasized the importance of political speech 
for the proper functioning of a democratic government.139 At first 
blush, the United Kingdom’s outright ban on third party political ad-
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vertising would seem to be inconsistent with the exalted status of politi-
cal speech.140 Nevertheless, as will be discussed more fully below, this 
result is attributable to the subtly different conceptualization in the 
United Kingdom of what “free speech” means—specifically, that the 
right to free speech also encompasses the rights to be protected from 
potentially damaging speech by others and to ensure the equality of 
one’s voice in relation to that of others.141 
B. Framing the Issue—Same Motivation, Different Approach 
 As discussed above, American and British electoral laws strive to 
protect different aspects of the electoral process.142 The American 
regulatory system protects the marketplace of ideas, at the expense of 
voters’ equality of voice.143 In contrast, the United Kingdom empha-
sizes political equality by stifling a wide range of political speech.144 
Nevertheless, despite these different approaches, policymakers in the 
United States and the United Kingdom are reacting to the same reality: 
distinctions between permissible and impermissible speech are difficult 
to make, especially in the protected realm of political speech.145 Except 
for the narrow exception in statutory law prohibiting corporate politi-
cal advertising, the United States has largely allowed comparatively ex-
tensive political advertising.146 In sharp contrast, the United Kingdom 
has banned all third-party advertising pertaining to an election or a can-
didate.147 Thus, as will be discussed below, the Citizens United decision 
makes sense within the American electoral regulation system, and any 
                                                                                                                      
140 See Communications Act, 2003, c. 21, § 321(2) (Eng.) (banning political advertis-
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effort to change that case’s result must be accompanied by broader 
electoral reform and a shift in First Amendment jurisprudence.148 
C. The American Approach to Regulation of Political Advertising 
 The United States’ and the United Kingdom’s differing approaches 
to the regulation of political advertising are, in fact, motivated by the 
same premise: that a system of fine distinctions among speakers and 
types of speech is both unjustifiable in theory and unsustainable in prac-
tice.149 In the United States, whatever the commonsense appeal of a dis-
tinction between corporate and individual speakers, courts and com-
mentators have found it surprisingly difficult to articulate a bulletproof 
argument justifying such a distinction.150 
 Moreover, advocates of a ban on corporate political advertising 
have struggled to identify a consistent jurisprudential thread justifying 
different treatment of corporate speakers.151 The Citizens United Court 
notes that, although legislation discriminating against corporate politi-
cal expenditures has been on the books for some time, until Austin in 
1990, no Supreme Court case had upheld such a distinction.152 Given 
the consistency of the Court’s decisions prior to Austin, especially Buck-
ley and Bellotti, Austin and its progeny seem to be a short-lived aberra-
tion in case law.153 Additionally, it is difficult to ignore the Court’s 
commentary on the issue in Bellotti: “We thus find no support in the 
First or Fourteenth Amendment, or in the decisions of this Court, for 
the proposition that speech that otherwise would be within the protec-
tion of the First Amendment loses that protection simply because its 
source is a corporation . . . .”154 Thus, the lack of a consistent precedent 
justifying a distinction between corporate and individual speakers, and 
the Court’s open hostility to such a concept in Bellotti, are significant 
impediments to a categorical ban on political advertising by corpora-
tions.155 
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 Aside from the precedential record, there are also conceptual dif-
ficulties with making excessively fine distinctions between speakers and 
types of speech.156 One of the fundamental tenets of American gov-
ernment is that the State cannot be trusted with too much discretion in 
setting the boundaries of acceptable speech.157 Instead, that trust 
should be placed in the people.158 Justice Scalia gave perhaps the most 
memorable articulation of this view in his dissent in Austin (which 
would later help undergird the majority opinion in Citizens United ): 
[G]overnmental abridgment of liberty is always undertaken 
with the very best of announced objectives . . . and often with 
the very best of genuinely intended objectives. The premise of 
our Bill of Rights, however, is that there are some things— 
even some seemingly desirable things—that government can-
not be trusted to do.159 
 Thus, unless the case for the unconstitutional nature of corporate 
political advertising is unassailable, such advertising should be permit-
ted—especially because it is by its nature political speech, which is ac-
corded the highest degree of constitutional protection.160 The Citizens 
United Court explicitly attacked the Austin framework for requiring “in-
tricate case-by-case determinations” and vesting too much power in the 
FEC to select which political speech deserves constitutional protec-
tion.161 
 The American reaction to the problem of distinguishing between 
productive and unproductive political advertising has been to protect 
the marketplace of ideas.162 The result has been implementation of pol-
icies that emphasize the quantity of available speech, even to the detri-
ment of its quality.163 In Buckley, the seminal case on political speech, 
the Court reasoned that “the concept that government may restrict the 
speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative 
voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment . . . .”164 In-
deed, according to the Court, the very purpose of the First Amend-
ment is to ensure “the widest possible dissemination of information 
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from diverse and antagonistic sources, and to assure unfettered ex-
change of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes 
desired by the people.”165 The Court was even blunter in Citizens United: 
“[M]ore speech, not less, is the governing rule.”166 
D. The British Approach 
 British courts have also recognized the difficulty of drawing dis-
tinctions in the political speech domain.167 Still, the reaction of policy-
makers in the United Kingdom has been decidedly different from that 
of their American counterparts.168 In the United Kingdom, the exercise 
of drawing distinctions among third party expenditures has been elim-
inated altogether; instead, all third-party political advertising has been 
banned outright.169 
 The justification for this categorical ban has taken two forms.170 
First, the ban supports the soundness of the framework for political de-
bate by equalizing political voice and denying an advantage to “those 
best able to pay.”171 Second, and most salient for the purposes of this 
discussion, “[t]he completeness of the prohibition avoids arbitrary and 
anomalous distinctions in practice.”172 Such a system, so different from 
that in the United States, is only possible because of the unique British 
electoral approach: protect political equality at the expense of protec-
tion of speech.173 
E. Contextualizing the Citizens United Decision 
 Simply put, the Citizens United decision is the natural extension of 
the American approach to the regulation of political advertising.174 
First, the First Amendment establishes a presumption that speech—
especially political speech—is constitutionally protected, absent some 
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overriding reason for its prohibition.175 Thus, any argument for ban-
ning corporate political speech because of its source is subject to strict 
scrutiny.176 Given this high hurdle, any argument to ban corporate po-
litical advertising because it unduly distorts the political process is 
unlikely to carry the day, due to what can be called the proof problem—
it is difficult, if not impossible, to produce viable empirical proof that 
corporate political speech is damaging to the democratic process.177 
                                                                                                                     
 In contrast, the United Kingdom does not have such a powerful 
tradition of protecting individual units of speech.178 Instead, British 
policymakers actually justify banning individual units of speech in order 
to protect equality of speech in the aggregate, and to protect against 
potentially misleading speech.179 Therefore, the commonsense argu-
ment that corporate political speech—and, indeed, individual political 
spending—can distort elections because of its self-serving nature has 
produced a blanket ban on such speech during election time.180 
 Second, the American system is predicated on a fundamental dis-
trust of the government’s capacity to make important distinctions in a 
variety of areas, speech foremost among them.181 In his influential dis-
sent in Austin, Justice Scalia wrote, “[t]he fundamental approach of the 
First Amendment, I had always thought, was to assume the worst, and to 
rule the regulation of political speech ‘for fairness’ sake’ simply out of 
bounds.”182 Consequently, there is little room for maneuver in conjur-
ing a blanket ban on a certain type of speech by certain speakers.183 
 
175 See U.S. Const. amend. I; Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898. 
176 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898. 
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179 See id. at 1346. 
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individuals, or by particularly notable individuals like actors or athletes. See Austin, 494 U.S. 
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 In the United Kingdom, the government has adopted as its purpose 
the goal of equalizing political voice and purifying the political proc-
ess.184 British elections are closely regulated events that are “not [are-
nas] of open political discourse,” but instead “confined decision[s] by 
the voters among the choices presented by the established political par-
ties.”185 In Animal Defenders, the House of Lords discusses—in an ex-
plicit manner unimaginable to Americans—the government’s duty to 
protect its citizens from the “potential mischief” of political advertis-
ing.186 As evidence of this mischief, the court openly voices distrust in 
British citizens’ ability to reach electoral decisions on their own: “The 
risk is that objects which are essentially political may come to be ac-
cepted by the public not because they are . . . right but because, by dint 
of constant repetition, the public has been conditioned to accept 
them.”187 In this environment, banning certain categories of political 
speech is not only justifiable—it is encouraged.188 
 Third, the American electoral process relies heavily on third party 
participants to develop the marketplace of ideas.189 When the aim is to 
ensure the robustness of that marketplace—to encourage the highest 
volume of speech in order to ensure that the most productive ideas are 
expressed and given the opportunity to prevail—it becomes quite diffi-
cult to limit speech for any but the most compelling reasons.190 In Citi-
zens United, the Court attacked the ban on corporate political advertis-
ing for depriving the public of “information, knowledge and opinion 
vital to its function,”191 and pointed out that corporations may possess 
“valuable expertise” in certain areas, as well as the unique ability to fa-
cilitate discussion on such topics.192 The Court’s emphasis on the com-
pleteness of the political debate creates an environment that is toxic to 
excessively fine distinctions between permissible and impermissible po-
litical speech.193 
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 In contrast, the British system relies far more heavily on the politi-
cal parties to set the political agenda.194 Third party political speech by 
citizens and corporations is seen as a potential source of disruption and 
distortion, rather than as vital participation in the democratic proc-
ess.195 British policymakers view regulation of third party expenditures 
as a way to dissipate layers of distortion around the core of the electoral 
process—specifically, the parties’ agendas.196 As such, it is easier to jus-
tify a ban, whether comprehensive or limited, in the British system.197 
F. How to Change the Citizens United Result 
 In order to change course from the Citizens United decision in an 
internally consistent way, American policymakers would have to make 
serious structural changes to the American electoral approach—if not 
its First Amendment jurisprudence.198 The American approach is pre-
dicated upon a robust marketplace of ideas furnished by third party 
participants and facilitated by a powerful presumption that speech is 
protected.199 Further, given this foundation, the proof problems associ-
ated with the argument that corporate advertising significantly distorts 
the political process render an outright ban untenable.200 
 In short, a critique of the Citizens United decision really goes to the 
core of the American attitude towards political speech and elections.201 
Whether one approves of the result in Citizens United or not, it is diffi-
cult to argue that the decision was not at least consistent with the Amer-
ican political structure.202 Absent compelling empirical evidence of the 
distortional effect of corporate political advertising, no interpretive 
gloss over existing law can justify a blanket ban on corporate political 
                                                                                                                      
194 Compare Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 907, with Feasby, supra note 52, at 19. 
195 See Animal Defenders, [2008] 1 A.C. at 1346. 
196 See id.; Feasby, supra note 52, at 19. 
197 See Animal Defenders, [2008] 1 A.C. at 1346; Feasby, supra note 52, at 19. 
198 See U.S. Const. amend. I; Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898, 911; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 
49; Redish & Wasserman, supra note 8, at 264, 268 (arguing that restrictions on speech run 
contrary to American values). 
199 See U.S. Const. amend. I; Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898, 907, 911; Redish & Was-
serman, supra note 8, at 290–91. 
200 See U.S. Const. amend. I; Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 907; see also Redish & Was-
serman, supra note 8, at 287 (citing examples of claims made by the Court with little or no 
empirical support). 
201 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 49; Redish & Wasserman, 
supra note 8, at 268. 
202 See U.S. Const. amend. I; Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898, 907; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 
49; Redish & Wasserman, supra note 8, at 264. 
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advertising.203 Consequently, a principled ban on political advertising 
would require modification of current law, perhaps by grafting a U.K.-
like political equality interest onto American jurisprudence, in order to 
provide a basis in American law for a distinction between corporate and 
individual political advertising.204 Alternatively, Congress could pass 
legislation that makes corporate political advertising more difficult or 
expensive.205 
Conclusion 
 A democracy can survive only if its institutions exhibit unswerving 
devotion to their foundational limiting principles in the face of tempt-
ing opportunities for digression. The political advertising realm pre-
sents a beguiling challenge: although common sense may suggest that 
the value of participants’ speech may differ, it is difficult to maintain 
principled distinctions among speakers and types of speech. In the 
United Kingdom, courts have displayed their fidelity to the British elec-
toral approach by upholding a blanket ban on political advertising 
against outside challenges—a policy that furthers the twin goals of 
equalizing political voice and maintaining the political parties as the 
center of electoral debate. In the United States, the Supreme Court has 
recommitted itself to upholding the fundamental protection of the po-
litical marketplace of ideas enshrined in both the First Amendment 
and the general American approach to elections. 
 Comparing the United Kingdom’s and the United States’ recent 
reactions to the question of how to make distinctions in the political 
speech domain illuminates the internal consistency in each country’s 
respective answer. In the end, any attempt to contest the Citizens United 
result will have to contend with the fact that, far from representing a 
dramatic shift in judicial attitudes towards elections, Citizens United is in 
fact a reaffirmation of basic First Amendment principles long-recog-
nized in Supreme Court jurisprudence. 
 
203 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 876, 898, 907, 911; Redish & Wasserman, supra note 
8, at 268. 
204 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898, 907, 911; Ewing, supra note 4, at 520 (stating 
that the British ban pursues the goal of political equality); Redish & Wasserman, supra note 
8, at 268; see, e.g., Pasquale, supra note 124, at 603. 
205 See, e.g., Sean Higgins, Dems’ Next Target: The Supreme Court and Corporate Cash, Inves-
tor’s Bus. Daily, Mar. 30, 2010, at A1 (discussing the possibility of legislation that would 
increase disclosure requirements and require CEOs to appear in political ads). 
